We estimate causal peer effects in police misconduct using data from about 35,000 officers and staff from London's Metropolitan Police Service for the period 2011-2014. We use instrumental variable techniques and exploit the variation in peer misconduct that results when officers switch peer groups. We find that a 10% increase in prior peer misconduct increases an officer's later misconduct by 8%. As the police are empowered to enforce the law and protect individual liberties, integrity and fairness in policing are essential for establishing and maintaining legitimacy and public consent [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] . Understanding the antecedents of misconduct will help to develop interventions that reduce misconduct.
. In the UK, in 1997 the then Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service Sir Paul Condon famously stated that there were up to 100-250 seriously corrupt officers in the Metropolitan Police Service (then, of about 27,000 officers) 7, 8 . That a few officers are responsible for much of the misconduct raises two possibilities. First, identifying and removing, or otherwise preventing, misconduct from this small number of officers would have a large effect. Second, and more worryingly, in the presence of strong peer effects, when the bad apples are not identified and disciplined, corruption can become pervasive and organized.
Research focused on individual deviances shows that complaintprone officers are more likely to be non-white [9] [10] [11] , male, less experienced [11] [12] [13] [14] and less educated 10, 15 . Research also shows that black officers have an earlier onset of misconduct, prior military service appears to delay the onset, and that neither education nor academy performance affected the timing of onset 16 . Recent work has also sought to understand the relationship between personality and misconduct. Donner and Jennings 17 , for instance, have shown that low self-control is a key predictor of engagement in general misconduct, particularly related to physical and verbal abuse. In the same vein, Pogarsky and Piquero 18 found that impulsivity mediates the influence of legal and extra-legal sanctions on the decision to commit hypothetical acts of misconduct.
Unlike research on individual deviance, research on organizational correlates of police misconduct is sparse. Some case studies have documented evidence of the influence of the police departments' characteristics, such as size, bureaucracy and professionalism, on the decision to arrest (for a review see Dunham and Alpert 19 ).
More recent evidence has shown that officers who perceive fairness in managerial practices are less likely to justify noble-cause corruption or adhere to the code of silence that protects 'bad cops' 20 . Some consideration has also been given to situational variables. For instance, the possibility of arrest in police−citizen encounters escalates with the mere presence of supervisors 21, 22 and officers also use greater levels of force against suspects encountered in high-crime and disadvantaged neighbourhoods 23 .
An understanding of deviance behaviour should not neglect social aspects. People making decisions inside organizations are constrained by authority rules and regulations, but are also constrained by social norms, cultural expectations and considerable peer-group pressures. Kohlberg's research on moral reasoning 24 has shown that, unlike during childhood (when children were more concerned about the physical consequences of their actions, that is, punishments and rewards, and when elements of reciprocity and fairness started to be incorporated pragmatically), moral reasoning in adolescence and adulthood is typically determined by beliefs about what others will think is right or wrong. At this level of moral thinking (termed as 'conventional' by the author) the individuals try to conform to the natural or accepted behaviour. For a discussion on how colleagues influence organizational ethics, see Treviño et al. 25 .
Compelling evidence for the existence of peer effects has already been documented in other settings. For example, Mas and Moretti 26 found that the productivity of cashiers in a supermarket chain increases with the effort of co-workers who are facing them, Zimmerman demonstrated that first-year college students in the middle of the SAT distribution who share a room with students in the bottom of the distribution obtain worse grades 27 , and Trogdon, Nonnemaker and Pais provided evidence that weight gain spreads through peer networks 28 . Herbst and Mas 29 provide a meta-analysis of peer effects in co-worker productivity: across studies they find that an increase in a worker's productivity causes an improvement of about 12% in the productivity of their peers. Herbst and Mas also show a consistency between effect sizes in the field and from laboratory experiments.
But although peer influences have been subject to analysis in various domains via both laboratory and field studies, surprisingly, much uncertainty still exists on the influence of peers in police ethics and integrity. The police misconduct literature already suggests an association, but the evidence falls short of supporting a causal link. For example, officers assigned to the same workgroup tend to share Letters NATUre HUMAN BeHAvioUr occupational attitudes owing to their interactions and exposure to similar environments 30 . This shows a correlation in attitudes, but not a causal link. In a survey in the Philadelphia Police Department, officers who thought that their peers considered the use of excessive force to be less serious were more likely to have citizen complaints made against them, as were officers who responded that they anticipated more minor punishments for theft 31 . Using the officers' judgements of their peers' attitudes while ignoring the dynamics of peer group networks again allows only a correlational not a causal claim. In the Dallas Police Department, one quarter of the variation in trainees' subsequent allegations of misconduct was attributed to field training officers in a multilevel analysis that nested trainees with their field training officers 32 . Nevertheless, this multilevel analysis is likely to be driven by common variance elements that are typical in nested structures and thus do not reflect causal relationships-again, because unobserved (and therefore omitted) shocks (such as changes in crime in the patrol area or increases in officer sickness) occurring in groups of trainees that share a common environment can mask peer effects.
Estimating social learning is challenging, because individuals from a peer group affect their peer group as much as the peer group affects them. In addition to this reflection problem, peer groups are not necessarily randomly sorted, given that high-performance workers could be allocated to a high-performance peer group, and so workers from the same peer group might be likely to share common unobserved characteristics. Moreover, members of a group might show similar misconduct because they are subject to similar shocks 33 . In our econometric approach, we address these issues using the instrumental variable estimation technique. We exploit the variation in peer quality that results after workers change line managers and switch peer groups. The misconduct of the new peers acquired following the change is instrumented with prior events of misconduct of their new peers' peers, allowing us to estimate the causal effect between peers.
We should note that by examining peer effects, we do not intend to engage in the debate about which specific mechanisms are driving these effects. Nor do our data allow us to distinguish between the mechanisms by which peer effects are mediated. For example, we will not discriminate between social influences motivated by learning about what behaviour is best to follow given the individuals' own needs or motivated by pure peer pressure and social conformity. In fact, owing to the difficulty of discriminating between these mechanisms, most research in the peer effects literature has focused on measuring the magnitude of peer effects only and has overlooked the mechanisms that may be generating the peer effects.
Our data covers four years of allegations of misconduct, from 2011 to 2014, for 49,403 officers and staff. For our analysis we required line manager history (from which we can infer peer groups), at least one peer, and demographic information for each person. These data were available for 35,924 officers and staff. Of these, 14,915 had records of one or more complaints during the period 2011 to 2014. However, most of them (54%) received only two or fewer complaints in this four-year interval (see Supplementary Fig. 1 ). We note that this is a very common pattern in police departments 34 , suggesting that misconduct is not systemic and that apparently only a minority of officers (or roles) are complaint-prone.
Allegations of misconduct are classified into seven categories: failures in duty, malpractice, discriminatory behaviour, oppressive behaviour, incivility, traffic and other allegations (we merged these last two). Their distributions in Table 1 reveal that for both members of police staff and police officers, the most recurrent allegations consist of cases of failures in duty, which can be, for instance, unjustified use of the relevant power, unauthorised entry on search, failure to inform detained persons of their rights and entitlements, failure to maintain proper custody or property records, interviewing oppressively or in inappropriate circumstances, among others.
The possible sanctions following misconduct are formal actions, unsatisfactory performance procedures, management actions, retirement or resignation (although most complaints end in no sanction). Formal actions involve written warnings, while UPPs are the organizational procedures designed to deal with unsatisfactory performance and attendance. Management actions refer to any action that can be locally resolved to handle the allegation of misconduct. They consist of, for example, the establishment of an improvement plan and the clarification of expectations for future conduct. We note that (Table 1) very few cases received a formal disciplinary action. Furthermore, over 50% of allegations against members of police staff and about 90% of the allegations against police officers had no subsequent actions taken. Most of these allegations were instances in which, following investigation and based upon the available evidence, there was no case to answer concerning the allegation. It can then be argued that the allegations documented might over-represent real events of misconduct. Nonetheless, research has shown that allegations are difficult to prove because of the relative lack of physical evidence and the absence of witnesses, and therefore cases deemed unsubstantiated do not necessarily imply the absence of police misconduct 16, 35 . We note that the use of all allegations, irrespective of their outcomes, is the approach usually adopted in the literature.
Supplementary Table 1 shows how the types of allegations correlate within individuals. People with alleged failures in duty seem to also exhibit, to some extent, some form of incivility and oppressive or discriminatory behaviour.
We test whether peer misconduct might affect the recurrence of workers' misconduct events. Peer groups were defined by linking officers and staff assigned to the same line manager. Our outcome is a binary variable, y it , that equals one if worker i had an event of misconduct during quarter t. Our independent variable of interest is the proportion of peers of i in t − 1 receiving reports of misconduct in t − 1,
. Since officers who patrol together or are in certain units together have a higher likelihood of being involved in reports of misconduct that might not be their fault, in order to prevent overestimating the effects of peers' misconduct, we consider as events of peer misconduct only those episodes in which i had no same-day concurrent allegations of misconduct. That is, allegations against peers and allegations against the target officer i correspond to different cases and were reported on different dates. W is a vector of control variables that include demographic characteristics (such as gender, length of service, employee's business group, employee type and employee performance) and additional controls for annual and seasonal effects, and β is a vector of coefficients for these controls. We estimate our main model as a linear probability model, in which P[y it = 1] refers to the probability of misconduct of worker i during quarter t.
Empirically, there are three challenges for the identification of peer effects 33, 36, 37 . First, the non-random assignment into groups means that individuals with similar characteristics may end up in the same group. Then what looks like peer effects could actually be due to common characteristics of the individuals themselves and not due to their peers. Without random assignment, the influence of individual's characteristics cannot be identified separately from the influence of their peer's characteristics. The second challenge is that, even when random assignment had been possible, individuals in the same group share similar environments and, thus, there could be unobservable institutional factors affecting the group members' performance simultaneously. These two threats are referred to in the literature as correlated effects and do not correspond to any social phenomenon between peers. Third, we would expect peer effects to be bi-directional. This means that peer effects are, in part, a property of the target individual and are not exogenous to the individual. This reverse causality problem holds even if we had had random assignment into groups.
To address these challenges, we proceed as follows. To absorb the effect of unobservable institutional factors affecting the likelihood Letters NATUre HUMAN BeHAvioUr of misbehaving either because some workers are exposed to particular stressful environments or high crime areas, or because workers sharing some background characteristics preferred to join specific business groups, our econometric specification includes dummy variable controls for the business groups the employees belong to. These business groups consist of: the Territorial Police (TP; divided into Boroughs North, Boroughs South, Boroughs West, Central, Criminal Justice and Crime, and Westminster), Specialist Crime and Operations, Specialist Operations, and Other Business Groups (which aggregates the groups Career Transition, Deputy Commissioners Portfolio, Directorate of Resources, Met HQ, National Functions and Shared Support Services). Our regressions also include quarter and year dummies (FE) to account for any seasonal fluctuation in crime.
To deal with individual heterogeneity, we also include controls for gender, years of length of service, employee type and police rank and police performance. Performance scores are reported on an annual basis in Performance Development Reviews and evaluate competencies in operational effectiveness, organizational influence and resource management. To alleviate the concerns of simultaneity bias, we estimate the effect of lagged peer outcomes on misconduct. More importantly, to deal with endogenous worker sorting into peer groups and potential correlated effects unaccounted for by our set of controls, we use instrumental variable techniques and estimate a linear probability model using two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators. Our identification strategy exploits the variation in peers that is experienced by workers who switch peer groups. Figure 1 illustrates the procedure followed. The top panel shows the hypothetical composition of peer groups for three different line managers across the quarters in one year, from t − 3 to t. We are interested in modelling the risk of misconduct of individual i (denoted as 'T' , for target individual, from now on) at time t. T is allocated to a new line manager, line manager 2, in quarter t − 1 and encounters new peers, 'D' , 'E' , 'F' , 'G' and 'H' . First, we look at his new peers and select those that were also recently allocated to line manager 2 (that is, H). Second, for the identified peer H, we observe his existing peers in t − 2 ('I' , 'J' and 'K') and compute the proportion of these existing peers who had reports of misconduct in t − 2 (P 1 ). Likewise, we also observe his existing peers in t − 3 (again I, J and K) and compute the proportion of these existing peers who had reports of misconduct in t − 3 (P 2 ). These two measures P 1 and P 2 are used as instruments of − y Peer i t ( 1) in equation (1) . We note that the construction of our instruments ignores the behaviour of any worker that was under the supervision of line manager 2 during t − 2 and t − 3, such as workers D, E, F and G, since, owing to potential nonrandom sorting, these workers might share some background characteristics with 'T' .
Valid instruments satisfy two properties. (1) The instrument must be relevant: the instrument must be correlated strongly with the endogenous variable − y Peer i t ( 1) . (2) The instrument must satisfy the exclusion restriction: the instrument must affect the outcome variable, y it , only through its effect on the endogenous variable. That is, the instrument should not independently affect the outcome variable y it . The exclusion restriction required for identification implies that misconduct of the peers of H in t − 2 and t − 3 (that is, misconduct of I, J and K) should not affect the current behaviour of T except through their impact on H in t − 1. If H had not been allocated to line manager 2, the behaviour of I, J and K should not affect the behaviour of the target officer T. Accordingly, to construct our instruments we discard in the first part of our procedure any new peer of T in t − 1 that had at least one peer that worked alongside T during quarters t − 3 to t. This strategy satisfies the exclusion restriction because only the peers of peers who had no evidence of direct contact with T during the past year are used in the construction of the instruments. We note that I, J and K satisfy this criterion.
In the bottom panel of Fig. 1 , we consider the case in which T experiences new peers but does not change line manager. Following the same procedure, we select H and observe the behaviour of his peers in t − 2 and t − 3 to construct the instruments. In our examples, only H was selected in the first step; however, when more than one peer in t − 1 satisfies the criteria imposed, we compute for each of these peers the two measures of peer conduct described (P 1 and P 2 ) 
Letters
NATUre HUMAN BeHAvioUr and average these measures across them. We use P 1 and P 2 as instruments of − y Peer i t ( 1) . Observations that satisfy our criteria for identification are not prevalent in the data and so our estimation of peer effects is restricted to a sample of 80,632 quarter observations (24% of the total quarter observations of the data) from 30,627 individuals. A summary of the average composition (by quarter) of the sample used is shown in Supplementary Table 2 . The left column displays the average composition per quarter for the whole sample. The right column restricts the sample to those observations in which an individual faces a change of peers. Supplementary Fig. 2 shows the distribution of the number of peers for each of these samples. There is no apparent evidence of a disproportionate selection of particular groups of individuals, which means our estimates of peer effects should generalize to the wider population of all officers and civilian staff.
We have outlined above how the instrumental variable estimation approach is critical to addressing the three challenges for identification of the causal effect of peer misconduct. To have an initial approximation of the direction and magnitude of peer effects on misconduct, in the Supplementary Information we present the estimates from linear probability panel data models-including both fixed and random effects-that cover all individuals in our data (see Supplementary Table 3) . These panel models do not correct for endogeneity. Although these panel models can be applied to the whole dataset, they do not address the three challenges of estimating the casual effect. We find that the panel models show significant but small effects of peer misconduct (a 10-percentage point increase in the proportion of peers with cases of misconduct in t -1 would rise the rate of misconduct in t by 0.66 percentage points, z = 14.60, P < 0.001, 95% confidence interval (CI) [0.057-0.075]). However, our instrumental variable approach reveals that the panel models greatly underestimate the causal effect of peer misconduct. Table 2 presents the estimates using our instrumental variable approach. The first variable, the proportion of peers in t − 1 with misconduct, is instrumented using the proportion of peers of H with misconduct from Fig. 1 (that is, using the proportion of I, J and K with misconduct). In Model 1, we present the estimates from a two-step efficient GMM estimator (results from the first stage are presented in Supplementary Table 5 ). Owing to the instrumenting of our endogenous variable, 75% of the observations are lost; however, as described earlier in Supplementary Table 2, the remaining sample is structurally similar to the whole sample. Since in this remaining sample more than half of the individuals (15,038 out of 30,627) have only 2 quarters or 3 quarters of observations, we are unable to apply panel data estimators. However, the standard errors of our GMM estimates are robust to arbitrary within-individual correlations. The coefficient of 0.768 (t(30626) = 4.91, P < 0.001, 95% CI [0.461-1.075]) in Model 1 for the instrumented proportion of peers at t − 1 with misconduct means that a ten-percentage-point change in the proportion of peers with misconduct would cause an increase of 7.68 percentage points in the target's misconduct.
In Model 1, the estimates for the control variables are in line with the findings of other studies in the literature: male workers, police officers and less experienced employees are prone to receive more allegations of misconduct. We also see expected signs for a positive effect of previous employee performance reviews.
At the bottom of the Model 1 column of Table 2 , we test the validity of our instruments. To be valid, they should satisfy two requirements: they must be correlated with the endogenous variable − y Peer i t ( 1) and orthogonal to the error process. At the bottom of Table 2 , we report the first-stage Kleibergen−Paap F statistics for weak identification, which examines the joint significance of both instruments in determining the endogenous variable. With a value of 97.75, sufficiently larger than 10, the threshold suggested by Staiger and Stock 38 to prevent biases by using weak instruments, the first-stage F-statistic confirms that our instruments are strong. We also report the Kleibergen−Paap LM test statistic for underidentification, which is robust in the presence of heteroscedasticity and clustering in errors. Rejection of the null indicates that our model is identified-that is, that our instruments are relevant. To evaluate the validity of the instruments, we also report the J-statistic of Hansen 39 that tests the null hypothesis of orthogonality of the instruments and the error process, which shows that our instruments are exogenous.
In Model 2, we use an alternative estimator, an instrumental variable probit (IV probit) estimator, which also alleviates endogeneity concerns, but it is appropriate for binary dependent variables and continuous endogenous covariates. The resulting estimates provide further statistical support for the presence of peer effects. At the bottom of the column for Model 2, we also report the χ 2 statistics of the Wald test of endogeneity of the instrumented variable, which rejects the null hypothesis that
is exogenous. Coefficients from Model 2 do not represent marginal effects as coefficients from Model 1 do. In order to facilitate the comparison of both models, Fig. 2 illustrates the extent of the peer effects from Model 2. Reassuringly, the peer effects are close in magnitude to those obtained by GMM in Model 1.
To eliminate the concern that our estimation of peer effects might still reflect correlated effects due to unobservable events not accounted for by our controls or endogeneity due to disregarded indirect interactions between individual i and the peers of peers used in the constructions of our instruments, we perform the following falsification test. In the top panel of Fig. 1 the behaviours of individuals I, J and K are expected to influence the conduct of T during quarter t through a single and unique channel, H. However, during quarter t former peers of T (that is, ' A' , 'B' and 'C') who remained under the direction of line manager 1 and, consequently, had no direct contact with H, should not be affected by any sort of misconduct of I, J or K that took place during quarter t − 2 or t − 3. Thus, our falsification test consists of replacing the dependent variable y it with the proportion of former peers of i who receive T is the target individual under study. The double line frames highlight the groups that T belongs to at each time. In quarter t − 1, T experiences a different peer group, either because he switches line manager (top) or because new workers are assigned to his group (bottom). In both cases, the behaviours of individuals I, J and K, who are the peers of worker H in t − 2 and t − 3, are used as instruments of the peers of T in t − 1. Observe that I, J and K had no direct contact with T during the past year (that is, t − 3 to t), and so this strategy satisfies the exclusion restriction required for identification.
NATUre HUMAN BeHAvioUr Table 2 . They include the proportion of male peers, the proportions of peers for each rank, business group and performance rating, the average length of service and the usual year and seasonal controls. Models 1-3 in Table 3 present the results of this falsification test. Models 1-3 are fitting the misconduct of former peers of the target, who should be unaffected by our instruments. The sample size for our falsification test is smaller because it is restricted to those quarter observations in which individuals change line managers (top panel of Fig. 1 ). Model 4 of Table 3 is fitting misconduct of the target, and here we should replicate our headline peer effect from Model 1 of Table 2 , but on the smaller sample size.
The peer effects for Models 1-3 of Table 3 are much lower, imprecise and not statistically different from zero, as we expected from the falsification test. Model 4 of Table 3 produced estimates very like those found in Table 2 Model 1, replicating our headline peer effect within the smaller sample. The specification tests confirm the validity of the instruments in all models, as informed by the Hansen J-statistics and F-statistics, except for Model 3. Any possible endogeneity problem that remains unsolved in Models 1-3 would induce some upward bias in the estimated peer effects these columns display. However, these peer effects are of small and nonsignificant size. Regarding the effect of the control variables, across the different specifications they exhibit the expected signs and comparable sizes.
In the Supplementary Information, we do additional robustness checks. To further control for placement in high crime areas, we repeat our main analysis and add fixed effects for geographical locations at a higher level. In terms of geographic policing, we add 32 dummy variables distinguishing 32 Borough Operational Command Units. We also control for specific groups of Table 7 , Model 1). The coefficient estimates on the control variables are keeping with those reported in Table 2 .
We also evaluate whether our results vary after controlling for the supervisors' performance. We repeat our analysis and include dummies for the performance scores of supervisors in the preceding year, quarter t − 4. These performance scores are reported on annual basis in Performance Development Reviews and evaluate competences in operational effectiveness, organizational All models estimate the probability of an event of misconduct in quarter t conditional on a set of covariates. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 when at least 1 event of misconduct is reported in quarter t. The independent variable of interest is the proportion of peers in quarter t − 1 with reported cases of misconduct. Our identification strategy exploits the variation in peer groups experienced by the individuals during the period 2011-2014. We use instrumental variable techniques for the identification of peer effects. Column 1 presents a two-step GMM linear model and column 2 represents an IV probit model. Two instruments are used for identification: the average proportion of peers of peers with incidence of misconduct in t − 2 and the average proportion of peers of peers with incidence of misconduct in t − 3. The models include dummy controls to account for seasonal variation in the report of misconduct events: Quarter FE and year FE correspond to quarter dummies and year dummies. The first stage results of column 1 are displayed in Supplementary Table 5 . 95% confidence intervals using standard errors clustered by individuals in brackets. Significance levels: ***P < 0.001, **P < 0.01, *P < 0.05, ~P < 0.10. We also investigate whether our effects are consistent by analysing separately the sample of individuals who moved to a new different peer group (top panel of Fig. 1 ) and the sample that remain in their current peer group but have new incoming peers (bottom panel of Fig. 1) , while retaining the complete set of exhaustive geographical controls. In Supplementary All models apply instrumental variable techniques for the identification of peer effects. Models 1 to 3 are part of a falsification test that studies the behaviour of former peers of an individual i who moves to a different peer group in t − 1. The dependent variable (DV) constitutes the proportion of these peers who had reports of misconduct at time t. The independent variable of interest is the proportion of peers of i in t − 1 presenting incidence of misconduct. This variable is instrumented by two measures of conduct of peers of peers of i. By construction, these two measures are expected to have no influence on the outcome variable of these models. Model 4 is presented for comparative purposes and uses the standard outcome variable of the study, misconduct of i at time t. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. Significance levels: ***P < 0.001, **P < 0.01, *P < 0.05, ~P < 0.10. Thus far, we have quantified sizeable peer effects after analysing peer-group dynamics. There remains the question of why officers and staff are moved from one group to another. In Supplementary  Table 13 , we study which factors correlate with transfers or line manager changes. While past misconduct and past performance appear to correlate with changes of line managers, this correlation is relatively small. On one hand, misconduct in the preceding semester increases the likelihood of switching line managers by only 4. Table 13) . Rather than by past behaviour, switching peer groups appear to be driven more by demographic characteristics. Inspectors and police sergeants, workers with few years of experience, and workers placed in particular geographic locations have a higher likelihood of moving peer groups (Model 3, Supplementary Table 13) .
Before turning to the main conclusions of the study, we must highlight a few caveats. Obviously, the major constraint of our study is the assumption that complaints filed against officers are accurate proxies of misconduct events. Yet, these complaints could either over-or underrepresent real misconduct cases. For example, fellow officers, as opposed to citizens, fail to report misconduct owing to their cultural rules of integrity. Informally, the police 'code' of loyalty discourages them from reporting misconduct of their peers 20, 40 . On the other hand, citizen allegations of misconduct may be discouraged when there is fear of retaliation or a low confidence in the complaint process 41 . Our data, however, do not allow us to distinguish the source of the complaints. Moreover, most of the allegations reported were unsubstantiated because of the relative lack of physical evidence and the absence of witnesses, which makes the cases difficult to probe. However, the absence of evidence does not necessarily imply the absence of police misconduct. In research of this nature, we are limited to the analysis of reported cases of misconduct, taking them as factual. We note, however, that the study of allegations of misconduct is the usual approach adopted by the related literature and so no study in this domain has been immune to this constraint.
There is also concern about whether the frequency of complaints mirrors officers' productivity. There is evidence suggesting that more proactive officers, officers placed in areas with high crime rates, and officers who, owing to their patrol assignment, are more likely to be in contact with citizens, are more likely to receive citizens' allegations of misconduct 14, 41 . Unfortunately, we were not able to control for the officers' arrest activity. However, to the extent that some degree of arrest activity might be associated with characteristics that might have remained relatively stable over the four-year interval of available data, such as rank hierarchy or the assignment to different police units, we do capture the effects of individual productivity.
In conclusion, we demonstrate that deviant behaviour can be spread through socialization: a ten-percentage-point increase in the fraction of peers with misconduct would raise the incidence of misconduct by an absolute 8%. These results are consistent when an officer switches to an entirely new group or when he receives new members to his current peer group. Perhaps officers' beliefs about what is acceptable and unacceptable behaviour become more permissive when officers become part of closely connected groups with deviant behaviour. Following Ashforth and Anand 42 , because life is lived in concrete settings, localized social cultures tend to be highly salient, and the individual's commitment to ethics may relax under the press of local circumstances. By a process of socialization, officers may learn to accept unethical practices. Moreover, local groups often provide explanations to rationalize or neutralize the guilt that individuals engaging in misconduct might otherwise feel, such as denial of the victim, denial of injury, denial of responsibility and refocusing attention, among others.
We should note that our results do not imply (or deny) the possibility that these effects occurred because officers learned from each other which behaviour is best to follow to satisfy their own interests or (perhaps) because they were corrupted by the pure peer pressure of their colleagues. Nor can we engage in the discussion about which mechanisms have driven these peer influences. Nevertheless, it is quite reasonable to speculate that a large portion of these effects reveal evidence of social conformity. Notice that extensive qualitative research highlights that police culture typically includes unwritten rules and is protected by a code of silence and extreme group loyalty 43 . Recent findings provided by Hough et al. 44 , after examining cases of alleged misconduct involving chief police officers in England and Wales over a six-year period, up to 2013, suggest that, throughout their careers, police officers felt under pressure not to step outside the norm. The ethical climate, promoted by a typical command-and-control style of management, has been alleged to lack ethical values or, even worse, to sustain the wrong kinds of values. The command-andcontrol style of management appears to encourage close mutually supportive and inward-looking networks that favour homogeneity, preclude difference and may accept or tolerate bullying behaviour. The findings of Hough et al. suggest that officers involved in misconduct are part of groups in which there is little to no stigma associated with misconduct.
Our peer effect results are to some extent consistent with the work of Chappell and Piquero , who suggested that peer effects are important determinants of misconduct based on correlational studies, and also lend support to differential association theory, according to which criminal behaviour can be learned through long, frequent and intense interactions with individuals holding attitudes that encourage criminal activity 45 . Beyond quantifying the magnitude of peer effects, our research has important policy implications. We have provided robust evidence that misconduct spreads between peers. It is unlikely that officers will have incentives to attempt to eliminate misconduct if there is no stigma associated with misconduct among their peers. Our results suggest that moving a bad cop to alternative locations will increase the risk of spreading misconduct. Thus, deterrence of police misconduct requires additional actions beyond the mere transfer of officers to other units. Studying which policy actions (ethical training, clear ethical standards, stronger sanctions, and so on) are more effective in preventing or discouraging misconduct represents an important arena for future research.
In addition to identifying sizeable peer effects, we also replicate the individual differences that are associated with misconduct. As seen in earlier research, we found that certain demographic characteristics are consistently present in individuals with higher risk of misconduct, such as few years of experience, poor ratings of past performance, male gender or certain employee types (such aspolice sergeant and constable).
Although it seems intuitive that individuals' experience and the social context in which they operate can influence their behaviour, our research provides compelling evidence for this intuition in police misconduct research. The final dataset, obtained by merging these data sources, has repeated quarterly observations nested within each of the individuals. It comprises 35,924 people (31.7% were civilian staff; 64.7% were male; and 13.6% were from black and minority ethnic groups) for the period 2011 to 2014. In this final panel of data, we were able to identify the work groups of individuals by linking officers assigned to the same supervisor in a given quarter. The median team size is eight.
Supervisors are in charge of familiarizing their team about their roles, responsibilities and local policing aims. Supervisors are also in charge of addressing underperformance in their teams. Team members are socially more cohesive and evaluated under similarethical standards. Our study evaluates the effects of peer misconduct under this definition of peer groups.
Statistical methods. We use instrumental variable techniques and test peer effects in a linear probability model using two-step GMM estimators. Our identification strategy exploits the variation in peers that is experienced by officers who switch peer groups. Figure 1 illustrates the procedure followed for the construction of our instruments.
Reporting Summary. Further information on research design is available in the Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
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-Accession codes, unique identifiers, or web links for publicly available datasets -A list of figures that have associated raw data -A description of any restrictions on data availability
The data that support the findings of this study are not publicly available. If a researcher would like to view and reproduce our results, please contact us to organize a supervised visit to our local network. We will be able to host the data on a machine here at Warwick. The machine would contain the raw data files as we received
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it from the police, a script to link the data files and prepare the data for analysis, and a script to produce the tables and figures in the paper. The code is all commented, and during the supervised visit to our local network, we could assist researchers should questions arise.
Field-specific reporting Behavioural & social sciences study design
All studies must disclose on these points even when the disclosure is negative.
Study description
We provide evidence of causal peer effects in police misconduct using data from about 35,000 officers and staff from London's Metropolitan Police Service for the period 2011-2014. We use instrumental variable techniques and exploit the variation in peer misconduct that results when officers switch peer groups.
Research sample 35 ,000 officers and staff from London's Metropolitan Police Service for the period 2011-2014
Sampling strategy
All officers in active service by the end of the first quarter of 2015.
Data collection
We used four databases maintained by the Metropolitan Police Service. The first dataset contains demographic information for about 50 000 police and civilian staff in active service at the end of the first quarter of 2015. The second dataset includes daily records of allegations of misconduct filled against civilian staff and police officers from the second quarter of 2010 to the first quarter of 2015. The third dataset comprises the individuals' performance scores. The fourth dataset contains semestral records of employees and their line managers from 2011 to 2015.
Timing 2011 -2014 Data exclusions
People without a matched line manager were excluded from the final sample used in the regressions.
Non-participation
No participant dropped out from the study or declined participation.
Randomization
Randomization was not conducted as part of this study.
Ecological, evolutionary & environmental sciences study design
All studies must disclose on these points even when the disclosure is negative. 
Study description

